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My last month in Kenya has been sobering. Ten million Kenyans were reportedly facing
starvation. There were daily reports on affected districts, those most vulnerable, and the
government’s mishandling of the disaster. Newspapers reported heavily on the incompetency of
the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB), which is responsible, under the guidance of
Trustees, in maintaining a Strategic Grain Reserve of about 6 million bags of maize cereal. How
best to do this? An obvious way is through purchase of local grain supplies. Despite drought and
resultant famine, poor infrastructure, high farm input costs, serious planting disruption after last
year’s post-election violence, and destruction of grain stores in the same violence – food is
available. Maize, a Kenyan staple, is available.
Despite maize in the fields, it is widely known that farmers are hoarding stocks in many districts.
Farmers are refusing the NCPB/government price of Sh1,950 per 90-kg bag. They are waiting to
be offered at least the same amount of money as that which was being assigned to imports (Bii,
2009b). “The country will continue to experience food shortages unless the Government
addresses the high cost of farm inputs to motivate farmers to increase production,” said Mr.
Jonathan Bii of Uasin Gish (Bartoo & Lucheli, 2009; Bii, 2009a, 2009b; Bungee, 2009).
Pride and politics, racism and corruption are to blame for food deficits (Kihara & Marete, 2009;
KNA, 2009; Muluka, 2009; Siele, 2009). Clearly, what are needed in Kenya are food system
planning, disaster management planning, and protection and development of agricultural and
rural economies.

As we well know, the availability and distribution of emergency food and water supplies is of
crucial concern during civil conflict and following major natural disasters such as drought.
Experience shows that during disasters, regional governments working with international
humanitarian aid organizations for, say, coordinating the shipment and distribution of food, and
providing accurate data regarding food availability and deficits, is most effective. Kenya is no
exception. Much blame for the inadequate food reserves lies in the centralized management
2
efforts, which invariably, have led to considerable corruption, graft, and inefficiencies. By
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See (Shaw, 2009) for a chilling discussion of the origins of the crisis in the failure of the longand short-rains in most districts but also the panic selling to Tanzania and elsewhere that
followed.
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February 2008, the country’s stock was only about 20 mill bags, which represents a 7 months
reserve since the country consumes about 3mill bags/month. The meaning of this was clear, even
a year ago. Food would need to start being imported as of early fall 2008. Many other indications
pointed to the same conclusion -- planting disruptions, erratic long rains, high fertilizer prices, high
food prices – which indicates much risk for a vulnerable population already importing over half its
wheat and rice and a significant amount of sugar. Shaw (2009) argues that the government
blundered terribly in its underestimation of supplies needed and suggests that serious questions
need to be asked about abysmal failing of the “sieve-like cereals board” tasked with import,
domestic purchase, management and distribution of subsidized maize flour.
Even though not all are in agreement, even in the best of times, it is clear that emergency food
aid and food distribution can result in long-term negative consequences for local food systems
(Shaw, 2009). Emergency food aid titles in donor nation-agriculture and food policies can, in
effect, prioritize the needs of the donor country by creating markets for domestic food production.
For example, in the United States the price supports and programs for (powdered) milk, certain
varieties of wheat, and other grains, has been a boon for US farmers, at times allowing for what
can be best seen as the dumping of food stockpiles (Berardi, 1985). It is ironic that food aid can
function mostly as donor-country farm aid, allowing for more certainty and steady market access
in grain-producing donor countries than in the crisis affected areas.
Regional economic agents and forces are left out of the loop, which is ironic given the cost
efficacy and ease of logistics that market distribution mechanisms focusing on local and regional
food supplies could bring the possibilities of reducing post-harvest losses, as with cases of
aflatoxin poisoning (NATION Team, 2009a; Ndirangu, 2009).
Further, the issue of cultural appropriateness of emergency food is particularly important. To be
sure, acceptability of the provided food must be considered (see recent work by Tuorila and
Monteleone). The acceptance or rejection of food, even during severe food deprivation, may even
be somewhat adaptive, relating to a normal biological function that prevents consumption of
potentially harmful foods (FitzGibbon & Hennessy, 2003). Concerns about acceptability are
especially visible when applied to genetically modified grains or milk powder from diaries using
BGH (Pew 2002).
Looking at the cultural acceptance of food is an important part of food security. This is true in
times of food surplus, when considering policy to enhance production, as well as in times of food
deprivation. One approach is to consider favorite staples, as well as foods less common but
nevertheless familiar to those receiving food aid: cassava, cow peas, and sweet potatoes, which
do well even in drought areas. Mbugua (2009) discusses increasing millet flour and cassava, and
green bananas in the diet, as well as arrow roots, sweet potatoes, millet, and sorghum. In “To
beat hunger, Kenyans urged to change their diet,” Peter Orengo (2009) discusses citrus,
bananas, paw paws, passion fruit, avocadoes, pear, plum, potato, onion, tomatoes, carrots,
capsicums, cucumbers, and common vegetables include cowpea leaf (vigna unguiculata), East
African spinach (amaranthus hybridus), pumpkin leaf (curcurbita pepo), Nightshade (solanum
nigrum), Swiss chard (beta vulgaris), Red kidney beans (phaseolus vulgaris), kale (brassica
oleracea var acephala) and Bush okra (chorchorus clitorius) as keys to resilience. Other
traditional and familiar foods include pumpkins or malenge.
Still, the fact remains that today, as many as 10 million Kenyans face starvation. George Munene
and Edward Koech (2009) question how long can herds people migrating, searching for pasture
and water near the Uganda border, live on porridge and wild tubers. It is alleged that one in every
three Kenyans may experience severe food deprivation, including 1.5 m children under school
feeding programs, 2.5m with diseases such as HIV and Aids and orphans, 3m in arid/semi arid
areas, and 2.5m poor in town slums.
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There are description of plans to import maize, duty-free, with negative implications for local food
supply chains. At the same time, the need for increasing extension services and availability of
fertilizers is recognized (Shimoli & Kiplagat, 2009). In addition, the following is to be part of an
inter-ministerial relief effort:
1. Relief in the form of maize and beans to affected areas,
2. Purchase of livestock from drought-affected areas,
3. Hay to be given to livestock herders in most affected areas,
4. Water to be provided in most severely-affected areas,
5. Six thousand tonnes of fertilizer to be supplied to poor farmers free of charge,
6. Provision of seed at a reduced price,
7. Twenty-five thousand tonnes of “orphan crop distribution” (cassava, sweet potato, yam,
arrow root, millet, sorghum, among others) to be provided to farmers in arid and semi-arid
areas, and
8. Government provision of 90 new tractors for plowing, to supplement the 85 at the
Agricultural Development Corporation.
But, will this enhance food security? What is meant by food security, at any rate? For some, it has
to do with the Strategic Grain reserve. This reserve is alleged to have, at best, 700,000 bags of
maize, compared to the mandated 6 million bags it is to have in stock for emergency (Ongiri,
2009). This state of affairs has not gone unnoticed by donor agencies. Many are demanding an
investigation into irregularities in the maize sector (Mathenge, 2009a, 2009b). The Board, while
reporting a 1.3 million-bag supply, still refused to pay domestic farmers the Sh2,500/90-kg bag
even as the government would be importing grain for Sh2,700 per kg bag. Any similar price to be
paid to local farmers was seen as unsustainable for future dealings (NATION Team, 2009b).

Clearly, there is enough food available.
Quite frankly, the concept that severe food deprivation needs to be met with some kind of
centralized response, based in institutions long known to be flawed creates a vicious cycle of
deprivation and dependence, underdevelopment, and hopelessness. Clearly, the only way
forward is reliance on regional, and in the case of Kenya, provincial institutions, to manage food
systems and provide unconditional commitment to support regional food production. In a current
grant proposal we are developing, we recognize the critical need of agricultural institutions to not
only provide food security, but to continue to support agriculture for both the jobs and tax revenue
it generates. Baseline studies to ensure accurate data in planning for food cycles and systems is
crucial. Clearly, food security, poverty reduction, and disaster management are important
components of any food deprivation relief strategy.
It is our belief that regional producers and distributors need to be systematically utilized for a
coordinated response to emergency food need, food for work programs, voucher, or economic
post-disaster recovery stimulus programs – programs that integrate food security, development,
and disaster management. Such a plan allows for the improved nutritional value of emergency
rations, increased cultural appropriateness of emergency food, and enhanced social networking
among local community agencies and individuals. This also mitigates, to some extent, the
collusion and corruption, especially during times of extreme food insecurity, which NGO and
government representatives necessarily must deal with (Kihara & Marete, 2009). It is a possible
way forward.
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